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Modern Systems-on-Chip (SoC) designs are increasingly heterogeneous and contain specialized semi-
programmable accelerators in addition to programmable processors. In contrast to the pre-accelerator era,
when the ISA played an important role in verification by enabling a clean separation of concerns between
software and hardware, verification of these “accelerator-rich” SoCs presents new challenges. From the
perspective of hardware designers, there is a lack of a common framework for formal functional specification
of accelerator behavior. From the perspective of software developers, there exists no unified framework for
reasoning about software/hardware interactions of programs that interact with accelerators.
This paper addresses these challenges by providing a formal specification and high-level abstraction for
accelerator functional behavior. It formalizes the concept of an Instruction Level Abstraction (ILA), developed
informally in our previous work, and shows its application in modeling and verification of accelerators.
This formal ILA extends the familiar notion of instructions to accelerators and provides a uniform, modular,
and hierarchical abstraction for modeling software-visible behavior of both accelerators and programmable
processors. We demonstrate the applicability of the ILA through several case studies of accelerators (for image
processing, machine learning and cryptography), and a general-purpose processor (RISC-V). We show how
the ILA model facilitates equivalence checking between two ILAs, and between an ILA and its hardware
finite-state machine (FSM) implementation. Further, this equivalence checking supports accelerator upgrades
using the notion of ILA compatibility, similar to processor upgrades using ISA compatibility.
CCSConcepts: •Computer systems organization→Architectures; •Hardware→Application-specific
VLSI designs; Functional verification; Electronic design automation;
Additional Key Words and Phrases: System on Chip, Hardware Specification, Application Specific Accelerator,
Architecture, Instruction-Level Abstraction, Formal Verification, Equivalence Checking
1 INTRODUCTION
Today’s computing platforms are increasingly heterogeneous, a trend that is expected to continue
into the foreseeable future as per the International Technology Roadmap for Semiconductors [22].
In addition to programmable processors – both general purpose and domain specific such as
Graphics Processing Units (GPUs) – today’s platforms contain dedicated accelerators in order to
meet the power-performance requirements posed by emerging applications. These accelerators
may be tightly coupled, i.e., part of the processor pipeline, or loosely coupled, interacting with
the processor through shared memory [27]. The latter form is dominant and the focus of this
paper. Apple’s A series of processors illustrate this growth in accelerators; the A8 processor has 30
accelerators [61] while the A10 has 40.
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Accelerator-rich platforms pose two distinct verification challenges. The first challenge is con-
structing meaningful specifications for accelerators that describe behavior exposed at the hard-
ware/software interface. Such specifications are important not just for correct design/verification
of hardware, but are also required to drive software and firmware development, both of which
must often be done before the hardware is “taped-out.” Specifications are also required to reason
about portability between different generations of accelerator architectures. They can mitigate the
software incompatibility risk involved in the implementation of microarchitectural enhancements.
Further, it is important to note that specifications must necessarily be an abstraction of hardware
functionality. Detailed models, e.g., Register-Transfer Level (RTL) descriptions, expose cycle-level
behavior that is not part of the hardware/software interface and thus are not suitable as specifi-
cations. In addition, RTL descriptions are also undesirable as specifications because the detailed
nature of these models means they are not amenable to scalable formal analysis.
The second challenge is reasoning about hardware-software interactions from the perspective of
software. For software that runs exclusively on a programmable processor, its execution semantics
are defined by the processor’s instruction set architecture (ISA) specification. Thus, the ISA serves
as a suitable abstraction of the underlying processor hardware for software verification. However,
similar abstractions of hardware for reasoning about software interacting with accelerators are
lacking. Software typically accesses accelerators through memory-mapped input-output (MMIO)
instructions that map memory and registers inside the accelerators to specific addresses. From the
perspective of the ISA, accelerator interactions appear to be just loads/stores of these addresses.
However these loads/stores trigger specific functionality implemented by the accelerator logic not
modeled by the processor’s load/store instruction semantics. Further, the accelerator may access
some memory shared with the processor, and potentially interrupt the processor on completion of
specific functions. These aspects make the ISA incomplete for modeling accelerator interactions. As
a result, reasoning about software that interacts with accelerators, an increasingly important task in
today’s SoCs, is usually done through ad-hoc abstractions/modeling techniques that compose ISA-
level models with FSM models of accelerators (e.g., in Verilog/VHDL). This results in an abstraction
gap between the ISA and the low-level hardware FSM, making software/hardware co-verification
with accelerators very challenging.
In this work, we propose a uniform and formal abstraction for processors and accelerators
that captures their software-visible functionality. This abstraction is called an Instruction-Level
Abstraction (ILA) and is based on the familiar notion of computation triggered by “instructions.”
For a processor, the ILA is based on the ISA. For an accelerator, the insight is that commands at its
interface are akin to instructions in a processor. Thus, just as the ISA models processor behavior
through specifying state changes resulting from each instruction, the ILA models accelerator
behavior by specifying state changes resulting from each of its “instructions,” i.e., its commands.
Further, as with ISAs, this modeling can distinguish the state that is persistent between instructions
(architectural state), from implementation state (micro-architectural state). Top-down this modeling
provides a specification for functional verification of hardware, and bottom-up it provides an
abstraction for software/hardware co-verification.
The ILA, like an ISA, has the following useful attributes. It provides:
(i) a modular functional specification as a set of instructions;
(ii) a meaningful state abstraction in terms of architectural state, i.e., state that is persistent
between instructions, while abstracting away implementation state; and
(iii) a specification for each instruction in the form of state update functions for architectural state.
In modeling designs with complex instructions, it is sometimes easier to describe the architectural
state update function as a sequence of steps, i.e., an algorithm. These steps may be required of all
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implementations, in which case they are considered part of the specification, or may only indicate a
possible implementation. The ILA model allows this sequencing to be expressed through hierarchy
in instructions, where an instruction can itself be modeled as a sequence of two different kinds of
child instructions.
This work builds on [62, 64] which introduced an informal notion of the Instruction-Level
Abstraction (ILA). That work viewed an ILA as a finite state system and focused on synthesizing
ILAs using program synthesis techniques [3, 41]. The focus of this work is on formalizing the
ILA as an instruction-centric operational model, well-suited as an interface between sequential
software and the underlying hardware. To treat processors and accelerators uniformly, the ILA
model explicitly includes functions that perform the fetch-decode-execute of instructions. This is
especially useful in reasoning about a system of interacting ILA models, one ILA per processing
unit, where the decode function (dependent on the fetch function) captures the condition whether
an instruction is enabled to execute or not, and the execute part actually performs the update of
the software-visible state. Note that the earlier finite state model could capture only the execute
part. Furthermore, we have introduced hierarchy into the ILA model, via the notions of child (sub-
and micro-) instructions, where an instruction at a higher level can be represented as a sequence of
child instructions at a lower level. Thus, the granularity of ILA instructions can vary, ranging from
processor instructions to software functions, but the focus is on modeling software-visible states
and their updates. Finally, this work showcases the usefulness of the formal ILA model and its
applications in verification through a set of rich case studies comprising accelerators from diverse
applications domains (advanced encryption, image processing, machine learning) and a processor
(RISC-V Rocket Core). The earlier papers had focused only on an accelerator for encryption.
Note that while we describe the verification applications using ILAs in detail, we do not claim the
verification techniques to be our central contribution – indeed, we have used standard verification
techniques and commercial off-the-shelf verification tools in our case studies. The point to note is
that the ILA model enables application of these techniques in a compositional manner, where the
set of instructions naturally provides an instruction-based decomposition into simpler verification
tasks.
Contributions of this Paper
Overall this paper makes the following contributions:
• It provides a formal model for the ILA (§ 3). This addresses critical modeling issues in both
processors and accelerators including gaps in previous ISA formal models. Top-down this
model provides a formal specification for use in hardware verification, and bottom-up an
abstraction for use in software/hardware co-verification that is uniform across accelerators
and processors.
• It supports hierarchy (§ 3.2) in modeling instructions which is missing from the earlier formal
ISA models [59]. In particular, it makes the important distinction between hierarchy in the
specification and hierarchy in the implementation.
• It demonstrates the applicability of the ILAmodel through several case studies on accelerators
(AES, RBM, Gaussian Blur) and the RISC-V Rocket processor (§ 4).
• It demonstrates the value in verification across models – between two ILAs, and between
ILA and FSM models – through successful case studies (§ 5), including finding a bug in the
RISC-V Rocket processor core. Verifying FSM implementations against ILA specifications
provides the basis for ILA-compatible accelerator replacement.
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Table 1. Comparison of Hardware and System-Level Modeling Frameworks
Modeling Language/Framework Level of Abstraction Formal
SemanticsAlg. Func. CA RTL GL
Verilog/VHDL ✓ ✓ ✓ Yes
Design Specific Models in C/C++ etc. (e.g., [5, 16, 60]) ✓ ✓ ✓ No
Chisel, PyMTL [10, 45] ✓ ✓ ✓ No
System Level Modeling Frameworks [7, 9, 14, 34, 36, 51, 53] ✓ ✓ Yes
ILA (this work) ✓ ✓ ✓ Yes
Column labels are Algorithmic (Alg.), Functional (Func.), Cycle Accurate (CA), Register Transfer Level (RTL) and
Gate Level (GL).
2 MOTIVATION AND BACKGROUND
2.1 System-Level/Hardware Modeling Frameworks
Table 1 categorizes notable system-level and hardware modeling frameworks in terms of their level
of abstraction and the suitability of their models for formal analysis. The “traditional” approach to
processor-based platform design uses: (i) functional models of processor ISAs (typically developed
in C/C++) to define architectural behavior, and (ii) cycle-accurate simulators (e.g., ESEC and gem5 [5,
16], also in C/C++) to explore the microarchitectural design space. Finally, the implementation
typically uses register-transfer level (RTL) descriptions in Verilog/VHDL. This approach corresponds
to the first two rows in Table 1.
Recent years have seen increased interest in system-level modeling that raises the level of
abstraction for design and verification. SystemC in particular, has seen significant adoption in
system/transaction-level modeling. However, RTL designs in Verilog, corresponding to SystemC
transaction-level models, are usually separately constructed by hand. Ensuring that the system-
level models in SystemC and the corresponding RTL are in agreement is a challenging problem.
Chisel [10] and PyMTL [45] propose to address this challenge by providing unified domain-specific
embedded languages in Scala and Python, respectively, for constructing functional, cycle-accurate,
and RTL models. While this can mitigate some challenges in testing equivalence among these
various models, bugs still slip through the cracks. In particular, these languages do not have formal
precisely-defined semantics which limits automated reasoning. This makes it hard to provide
guarantees of equivalence between models at different levels of abstraction.
Models with formally-defined operational semantics are amenable to formal analyses such as
equivalence and property checking. Examples include StateCharts, SystemC, Esterel, Transaction
Level Modeling (TLM), and others [1, 4, 9, 14, 31, 34–36]. A notable effort in this category is
BlueSpec, a high-level specification and design language that describes hardware as sets of state
change rules (guarded atomic actions) which execute atomically [7, 51]. The BlueSpec compiler
synthesizes the circuits and exploits parallelism with a scheduler to choose the interleaving of rules
automatically [28, 36]. BlueSpec has well-defined operational semantics and supports modular
verification using SMT solvers and interactive theorem-provers [29, 67].1
2.2 Desired Hardware Abstraction Characteristics
A given hardware design can be abstracted in many different ways. In this paper, we argue for
abstractions of hardware that satisfy two important properties:
1See §7 for a detailed comparison of the ILA with BlueSpec and other related efforts.
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S		 = {AesState,Addr, Length,Ctr,OutData,Mem,… }I			 = 0,0,0,0, 0,…W = InAddr,InData,CmdV		 = Cmd ≠ 0 ∧ InAddr ≥ 0xFF00 ∧ (InAddr ≤ 0xFF10)F		 = concat(Cmd, InAddr, InData)
𝛿I = InAddr == 0xFF02𝑁I Addr = ITE(Cmd == 1, InData,Addr)𝑁I OutData = ITE(cmd == 0,Addr,0)𝑁I ∗/Addr =∗/Addr
𝛿P = Cmd == 1 ∧ InAddr== 0xFF00 ∧ InData== 1𝑁P AesState = 0𝑁P Mem = encrypt Mem,Addr,Length,Key,Ctr
// Instruction 6: START_ENCRYPT
// Instruction 0: RD/WR_ADDR
(b) AES ILA definitions (without child-ILA definition)
Instruction Description
0 RD/WR_ADDR Get/set address of data to encrypt/decrypt
1 RD/WR_LENGTH Get/set length of data to encrypt/decrypt
2 RD/WR_KEY0 Get/set key register 0
3 RD/WR_KEY1 Get/set key register 1
4 RD/WR_SELECT Get/set key selector
5 RD/WR_CTR Get/set counter for CTR mode
6 START_ENCRYPT Start the encryption state machine
7 GET_STATUS Poll for completion
(a) AES ILA instructions
Fig. 1. ILA for an AES accelerator.
• The abstraction cleanly separates hardware and software verification concerns. This requires
that the abstraction precisely codify the hardware/software interface so that software and
hardware can be separately developed and verified to be conformant with the interface.
• The abstraction treats programmable processors and accelerators uniformly. Software verifi-
cation in future architectures will need to reason about accelerator interactions in addition to
processor ISAs, while hardware verification will need to reason about the software interface
presented by these accelerators. A uniform abstraction for these architectures is required in
order to provide a common accelerator-agnostic framework for this verification.
None of the frameworks in Table 1 satisfy these properties. In this paper, we take a step towards
addressing this gap by introducing a uniform and hierarchical instruction-level abstraction (ILA):
an abstraction of hardware that precisely delineates the hardware/software interface. Our notion of
the ILA treats programmable processors and semi-programmable accelerators uniformly, including
hierarchical modeling of microarchitecture for accelerators, similar to processors. Past work has
shown how abstractions at the instruction-level can be successfully used for software/hardware
co-verification [63].
3 FORMAL MODELING
In this section, we formally define the ILA model and its execution semantics. A motivating example
used through this section is shown in Figure 1, for an accelerator (from opencores.org) [38] that
implements the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). The derived ILA instructions are shown
in Figure 1(a): six instructions read/write configuration registers, one starts encryption, and one
checks the completion status. As discussed earlier, these “instructions” correspond to commands
presented at the accelerator interface by the processor.
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3.1 Instruction-Level Abstraction (ILA)
This section defines the ILA, without considering hierarchy. An ILAA is a tuple: ⟨S, I ,W ,V , F ,D,N ⟩,
where
S is a vector of state variables,
I is a vector of initial values of the state variables,
W is a vector of input variables,
V : (S ×W ) → B is the valid function, B = {0, 1}
F : (S ×W ) → bvecw is the fetch function,
D = {δi : bvecw → B} is the set of decode functions,
N = {Ni : (S ×W ) → S} are the next state functions.
The state variables in S can be of type Boolean, bitvector, or array (representing memory). For
processors, S includes architectural registers, flag bits, data and program memory. For accelerators,
S includes memory-mapped registers, internal buffers, output ports to on-chip interconnect, data
memory, etc. We refer to these state variables as “architectural state” because like an ISA’s architec-
tural state, they are persistent across instructions. In the ILA for the AES example, as shown in
Figure 1(b), the architectural state variable Addr denotes the address of data to encrypt, and Length
is the data length. I denotes the set of initial values of the corresponding architectural states in S .
The vector of input variablesW includes input ports of the hardware module, such as processor
interrupt signals and accelerator command inputs. For example, input InData in the AES ILA is
the data from the memory system for memory-mapped accesses.
Instructions in an ILA follow the fetch/decode/execute paradigm, similar to a processor ISA.
To model event-driven accelerators, we include a valid function V : (S ×W ) → B that indicates
if an instruction is triggered based on state and input values. For example, the AES accelerator
executes instructions only when InAddr is within a specified range, i.e., V (S,W ) ≜ (InAddr ≥
0xFF00) ∧ (InAddr ≤ 0xFF10).
The opcode of the instruction is modeled as a bitvector of width w (denoted bvecw ). If the
instruction is triggered (i.e., ifV is true), then the fetch function F : (S ×W ) → bvecw indicates how
it is extracted from the state and inputs. For processors, the opcode is fetched from the program
memory location pointed to by the program counter, i.e., F (S,W ) ≜ read(IMEM, PC). If interrupt
modeling is desired, F concatenates this with the interrupt signals (inputs). Similarly, accelerators
extract the opcode for decoding instructions. The opcode for the AES example is the concatenation
of the memory-mapped input signals, as shown in Figure 1(b).
Each instruction (indexed by i) is associated with a decode function δi : bvecw → B, indicating
whether it is issued. For example, as shown in Figure 1(b), the instruction START_ENCRYPT is issued
only when it receives a “store value 1 to address 0xFF00” command at the interface. The set of
all decode functions is D = {δi | 0 ≤ i < k}; k is the number of instructions. In an ILA, only one
instruction can be issued at a time, i.e., D is one-hot encoded. Non-determinism should be modeled
with explicit choice variables (inputs) provided by the external environment. Note the valid function
V returns true if and only if one decode function returns true.
Finally, each instruction is associated with a next state function Ni : (S ×W ) → S , which
represents the state update when the instruction is executed. The set of all next state functions in
the ILA is N = {Ni | 0 ≤ i < k}.
To summarize, Figure 1 Part (a) shows the description of all eight instructions of the AES
accelerator. Part (b) shows the ILA definitions for S , I ,W ,V , F , and the decode (δi ) and state update
functions (Ni ) for two of the instructions.
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S" = {Counter,RdData, EncData,AesState, Addr,… }I" = 0,0,0,0,… ; W" = ∅; V" = AesState	 ≠ 0 ; F" = AesState
𝛿@ = AesState == 1𝑁@ AesState = 2𝑁@ RdData = load Mem, Addr+ Counter
𝛿H = AesState == 2𝑁H AesState = 3𝑁H EncData = encrypt(RdData,Key,Ctr)
𝛿O = AesState == 3𝑁O AesState = ITE(Counter< Length,1,0)𝑁O Counter = ITE(Counter< Length,Counter+ 1,0)𝑁O Mem = store(Mem, Addr+ Counter,EncData)
// Child-instruction 0: LOAD_BLOCK
// Child-instruction 2: STORE_RESULT
// Child-instruction 1: ENCRYPT
(a) AES child-ILA definitions (𝑚V = 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒, i.e., micro-ILA)
1
2
3
0
START_ENCRYPT
LOAD_BLOCK
ENCRYPT
𝐂𝐨𝐮𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐫 < 𝐋𝐞𝐧𝐠𝐭𝐡
STORE_RESULT
𝐂𝐨𝐮𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐫 ≥ 𝐋𝐞𝐧𝐠𝐭𝐡
(b) The loop structure in the AES child-program. 
(Each node shows the value of AesState.)
Fig. 2. Child-ILA for an AES accelerator.
3.2 Hierarchical ILAs
In modeling designs with complex instructions, it is often easier to describe the architectural
state update function as a sequence of steps, i.e., an algorithm. These steps may be required of all
implementations, in which case they are considered part of the specification, or may only indicate
one possible implementation. For example, the Intel x86 architecture [39] specifies the string copy
instruction REP MOVS as a sequence where the MOVS instruction is repeated until register ECX (count)
is decremented to 0. Note that the state update performed by this instruction at the architectural
level in not atomic, and this fact needs to be captured in the architecture model. Similarly, in the
AES accelerator in Figure 1, the START_ENCRYPT instruction involves reading data, encrypting it, and
writing the result. The encryption itself is also a complex operation that needs to be described as a
sequence of steps.
Child ILAs. To support modeling such complex instructions, we extend the ILA definition from
Section 3.1 to support hierarchy. A hierarchical ILA may contain child-ILAs, each of which describes
the sequence of steps in the complex instruction. Instructions in child-ILAs, referred to as child-
instructions, also follow the fetch/decode/execute paradigm. These may, in turn, contain other child-
ILAs, and we refer to an ILA containing a child as a parent-ILA. In the AES example, START_ENCRYPT
is modeled by a child-ILA with child-instructions for message loading, encryption, and storing
results, as shown in Figure 2 (a). The child-instruction ENCRYPT is further modeled by a child-ILA
for the actual encryption algorithm. As we will show later in Section 4.1, two different child-ILAs
can be used to describe two different AES implementations.
A child-ILA is defined similar to an ILA. Its state variables are denoted Sc , some of which may
be shared with the parent-ILA.W c is the set of its input variables, and is a subset of inputs of the
parent-ILA. The initial values are I c , and the initial values of the shared state variables are the same
as that of the parent-ILA. For the AES example in Figure 2 (a), the child-ILA has no inputs and
contains three additional state variables (Counter, RdData, and EncData). The other components
of the child-ILA: V c , F c , Dc , N c are similarly defined in terms of Sc andW c . The state variables
shared between the child-ILA and the parent-ILA are in lock step, since they denote shared state,
i.e., updates to the shared states are visible to the parent-ILA when a child-instruction is executed,
and vice versa. For the AES example in Figure 1, the instruction START_ENCRYPT of its parent-ILA
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updates shared state AesState to 1 and keeps Mem unchanged; this starts the child-ILA with the
child-instruction LOAD_BLOCK.
Informally, a child-ILA steps through a sequence of child-instructions, where the sequencing is
implicitly determined by the state updates (using its state variables). That is, the child-instructions
are sequentially composed. This can be viewed as a child-program. For the AES example, the
child-program in Figure 2 (a) models the START_ENCRYPT instruction, which comprises a loop and is
controlled by the states AesState and Counter, as illustrated in Figure 2 (b).
3.2.1 Micro-instructions and Sub-instructions. Child-ILAs can be used to model specifications
or implemented algorithms. When modeling an implemented algorithm, their instructions serve
the same role asmicro-instructions for complex instructions in processors, which represent one
possible implementation of that instruction. We distinguish this from instructions of child-ILAs
when used for specification, i.e., when they specify behavior that must hold for all implementa-
tions. In the latter case, we call them sub-instructions. For example, in REP MOVS, the steps of
the instruction are part of the specification, and thus, these sub-instructions are required of all
implementations. Therefore, child-ILAs will be referred to as sub- or micro-ILAs depending on
whether they have sub- or micro-instructions respectively.
The distinction between micro-instructions (implemented algorithm) and sub-instructions (spec-
ifications) is important. For example, the ARM Cortex-M3 user guide [6] says that load-multiple
(LDM) and store-multiple instructions (STM) access memory “in order of increasing register numbers.”
Another shared memory interacting processor would expect to see this order. Further, these in-
structions are interruptible, thus the intermediate values of the architectural states are visible to
the interrupt handler. This order of accesses is therefore desired in the formal abstraction when
verifying systems with multiple interacting hardware components. However, while the user guide
only describes one particular implementation, the ARM architecture specification does not impose
this ordering requirement. This is reflected in the previous work on the ARM ISA formal specifica-
tion and verification [59]. While they state that “some load instructions may be split into multiple
micro-ops” and account for it by updating the architectural state when each micro-op completes,
when verifying this instruction they check the state only “when the last micro-op completes.” We
emphasize that it is important to treat these split accesses asmicro-instructions (i.e., as implemented
algorithms) and not sub-instructions.
Due to the differing roles of specifications and implementations in verification, we impose some
restrictions on hierarchical ILAs. A sub-ILA may contain sub-ILAs or micro-ILAs. However, a
micro-ILA can only contain micro-ILAs, as an implementation cannot contain a specification.
3.2.2 Definition of Hierarchical ILAs. A hierarchical ILA A is defined as: ⟨S, I ,W ,V , F ,D,N ,C⟩.
The new componentC = {(Ac1,m1), . . . } is a set of tuples consisting of child-ILAs and a Boolean flag
that denotes whether the particular child-ILA is a micro-ILA (mi = true) or a sub-ILA (mi = false).
In Figure 1, Part (b) shows the ILA definitions for S , I ,W , V , F , and the decode (δi ) and state
update functions (Ni ) for two of the instructions in the AES example. Part (a) of Figure 2 shows the
definitions for a child-ILA that models the START_ENCRYPT instruction.
3.3 ILA Execution Semantics
An ILA model is essentially a labeled state transition system that emphasizes modularity through a
set of instructions. The semantics of execution of an ILA instruction is as follows:
V (S,W ) δi (F (S,W )) S ′ = Ni (S,W )
S
i⇝ S ′ (1)
Rule (1) says that an ILA can transition from state S to S ′ if the following conditions are satisfied:
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• An instruction is triggered: V (S,W ) is true .
• The i-th instruction is issued: δi (F (S,W )) is true .
• State update of the vector S ′ is according to Ni (S,W ).
Execution of a child-instruction in a child-ILA is similar:
V c (Sc ,W c ) δcj (F c (Sc ,W c )) S ′c = N cj (Sc ,W c )
Sc
j⇝ S ′c (2)
State updates in instructions at the lowest level of an ILA hierarchy are considered to be atomic,
i.e., indivisible. This enables reasoning about concurrency with multiple ILAs.
The focus of this paper is on using an ILA to model the behavior of a single processor/accelerator
core using instructions. This is useful for capturing a sequential programming model for the core’s
operation as it processes a sequence of instructions. Although the hardware may operate on
instructions in parallel (similar to pipelined processors), the programming abstraction for software
is that of a single sequential thread of control (similar to the ISA programming model). The value
of the ILA is that this sequential programming model is now extended uniformly from processors
to hardware accelerators. We believe this abstraction from parallel hardware in accelerators to a
single sequential programming model is a key enabler for system design and verification, and a central
contribution of the ILA methodology.
Further, once we have ILAs, each of which represents a single thread of control that updates
shared architectural state, we can use them to model a system of concurrent cores with shared
memory. Specifically, instructions are sequentially composed within an ILA, whereas concurrency
and interleaving models are handled outside of ILAs. Analogous to ISAs for processors, we can use
techniques for modeling multi-thread concurrency and memory consistency with multiple ILAs.
This is discussed briefly in Section 6.1 later – case studies and applications with concurrent cores
are outside the scope of this paper.
4 CASE STUDIES: MODELING
In this section, we evaluate the ILA’s modeling abilities using four case studies: application-specific
accelerators for image processing, machine learning, and cryptography; and the Rocket processor
core based on the RISC-V ISA. With designs from different application domains, the ILA is shown
to be a uniform model usable across heterogeneous accelerators and processors. Verification for
these case studies is described in the next section.
We create the ILA for each design based either on an informal English specification or a high-level
reference model. These ILAs are synthesized using template-driven program synthesis [62], or in
some cases manually written in Python using our ILA library API. 2 Table 2 provides information
about each case study. Columns 2-5 give the reference model type, and sizes of the reference model
and RTL, respectively. The RTL descriptions are either generated by high-level synthesis or taken
from OpenCores.org. Columns 6 and 7 provide the number of instructions/child-instructions in the
ILA, and ILA size (in lines of Python code). We now discuss salient aspects of each case study.
4.1 Application-Specific Accelerators
We consider two types of accelerators: (i) those using local memory for computation and direct
memory access (DMA) to load/store data into their local memory buffers, and (ii) those streaming
input and output data. The commands at the interface relate to: (i) the interface protocol, and (ii)
the computation tasks. In the AES example, the interface protocol refers to setting configurations
2All models and templates are available on GitHub: https://github.com/PrincetonUniversity/ILA-Modeling-Verification.
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Table 2. ILA Modeling Case Studies
Design Name
Design Statistics ILA
Reference Ref. Lang. Ref. Size RTL Size # of insts.(parent/child)
ILA Size
(Python LoC)
RBM System-level design [55] SystemC 1211† 10578 3/14 1009
GB (High-level) Halide description [56] C++ 288† 6935 2/2 538
GB (Low-level) HLS input [56] C++ 1718† 6935 2/4 1561
AES (table) RTL simulator [38] C++ 1905 1105 8/5 435⋆
AES (logic) Software simulator [38] C 328 - 8/7 337⋆
RISC-V Rocket Chisel description [8] Chisel 3488‡ 18252 43 1672⋆
⋆ILA synthesis template size. †Excluding shared library. ‡Processor core only.
and querying the status, and the computation task is the block encryption operation modeled in
the START_ENCRYPT instruction.
4.1.1 Restricted Boltzmann Machine. Restricted Boltzmann Machine (RBM) is a stochastic
neural network commonly used in recommendation systems. We model the RBM accelerator from
the Columbia System Level Design Group [55]. It is implemented in SystemC and synthesized to
Verilog. The accelerator supports both prediction and training, and uses the contrastive divergence
learning algorithm. It exchanges data with shared memory via DMA.
We manually constructed the ILA of the RBM accelerator. The ILA captures both the interface
protocol and the computation. It models the interface activities where the accelerator autonomously
initiates DMA transactions to load and store training/testing datasets after receiving an initial
configuration. It contains 3 instructions, ConfDone, ReadGrant, and WriteGrant, which set the
configuration, grant DMA read and write transactions, respectively. The complexity of computation
and DMA interaction is managed by five child-ILAs for loading, storing, coordination, training,
and prediction, respectively, comprising a total of 14 child instructions. The training and predicting
child-ILAs, in turn, have child-ILAs that model their computation. The computation iteratively
updates two regions of private local memory for the hidden layer and visible layer in a fixed order.
This order is maintained by control registers in the implementation, using child-ILA states. Recall
that child-ILA states are updated by a child instruction, which activates the decode function of a
subsequent child instruction.
This case study illustrates handling of both protocol and computation, the value of hierarchical
ILAs, and how order is captured by the state update and decode functions of the child-ILA.
4.1.2 Gaussian Blur. The image processing accelerator performing the Gaussian Blur (GB)
operation is from the Stanford VLSI Research Group [56]. Its behavior is described in Halide [57], a
domain specific language for developing high-performance image processing applications. Halide
descriptions can be compiled into C++, which can then be synthesized to a Verilog implementation
through high-level synthesis (HLS). The GB accelerator takes an image as streaming input, and
utilizes a 2-dimensional line buffer to collect one part of the image at a time for the GB kernel
function computation. It then streams out the result for each part as soon as it is ready.
We manually construct two ILAs, GBH and GBL , from design descriptions at two different
levels. GBH is derived from the high-level Halide description, and models the specification. GBL is
derived from the lower-level C++ code compiled from the Halide description and models micro-
architectural details. GBH captures the size of input and output images, the streaming pattern
(row-major traversal), data source for the kernel function, andwhen the result is ready. GBH does not
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specify how streamed data is buffered, whereas GBL additionally includes a specific line buffering
mechanism [56].
In this case study, we focus on specifying the streaming data interface and the output image
accumulation. The kernel computation is modeled as an uninterpreted function, a standard practice
in verification to allow decoupling of control verification from data-intensive computations that
can be verified separately. (This is supported by standard SMT solvers, described in Section 5.1.)
Both GBH and GBL have two instructions, WRITE and READ, that represent sending and receiving
a pixel to and from the I/O boundary, respectively. The two ILAs have the same instruction set,
i.e., the same hardware interface, but have different levels of abstraction. The extra complexity of
GBL in modeling the 2-dimensional line buffer and stream buffers is captured by its child-ILAs;
child-instructions model data movement between different components.
This case study serves to illustrate the ability of the ILA to model: (i) streaming I/O, and (ii)
different levels of abstraction for the same instruction set through additional micro-architectural
detail.
4.1.3 Advanced Encryption Standard. This case study, introduced in Section 3, considers
a cryptographic engine from OpenCores [38] implementing the Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES). The accelerator receives configurations via memory-mapped I/O and uses DMA to exchange
data with shared memory. The configuration includes the encryption key, initial counter value,
plaintext location, and length, which are stored in registers mapped to the memory address space.
This accelerator works in AES-CTR mode [44], where the plaintext is fetched from the shared
memory starting from the location pointed to by the plaintext location. The accelerator operates
in the following sequence: fetch one block from memory, apply exclusive-OR operation between
plaintext and the AES encrypted counter to get the ciphertext, and then store the block back into
the same location. Each block has 128 bits and the complete encryption operation has 10 rounds.
The ILA model uses child-ILAs for modeling the encryption function.
We synthesize two different ILAs using template-driven synthesis [62]. These ILAs, AESC and
AESV , are based on C and Verilog implementations, respectively. They have the same architectural
instruction set, but with differences in the block-level and round-level implementations in their
micro-instructions.
The instructions on the interface has been shown in Figure 1. Only START_ENCRYPT instruction
has child instructions, depicting block-level encryption. At the block level, AESV has more child
state variables (mostly counters and control signals), and its memory access is modeled at a finer
granularity than AESC . At the round level, there is one micro-instruction for each round. AESV
uses a table look-up, while AESC uses logical operations. We capture these differences in their
micro-ILAs. This case study illustrates the ability of the ILA to describe two different implemented
algorithms for the same set of instructions.
4.2 General Purpose Processors
The ILA of a general purpose processor is based on its ISA, and the ILA has the same instructions
and semantics. However, in contrast to existing formal ISA models (e.g., ISA-Formal [59]), our
model has a uniform treatment of interrupts (and possibly other input signals) and instructions,
rather than treating interrupts as a special case. Further, it supports hierarchy and distinguishes
sub-instructions from micro-instructions; this is missing in previous work.
4.2.1 RISC-V. RISC-V is a free and open ISA with increasing adoption in industry and academic
research. It has a base ISA with several extensions for advanced functionality. We synthesize the
ILA of the base integer ISA RV32I with the DefaultRV32Config of Rocket – a single-issue in-order
5-stage pipeline implementation (part of the Rocket Chip SoC generator) [8].
11
The ILA covers: (1) user-level base integer registers and instructions, (2) machine-level control
status registers (CSRs), (3) environment call/trap return instructions, (4) the address translation and
the memory-management fence, and (5) interrupt and hardware interrupt handling. The semantics
of each instruction are as follows: if an interrupt occurs, the next state is updated as the result of
the interrupt. Otherwise, the state update is performed according to the instruction word. This
case study demonstrates modeling interrupts and instructions uniformly. The RISC-V ISA exposes
the synchronization between the memory hierarchy and the translation lookahead buffer (TLB)
through the SFENCE.VMA instruction. The lack of synchronization could result in stale page table
entry (PTE) references. The TLB in the RISC-V ISA is software visible, and we include it in our
ILA model as an architectural state variable. However, its size, associativity and other parameters
are not specified by the ISA specification, so we model it as a ghost TLB, which can potentially
hold any PTE that has been referred to but has not been explicitly flushed out. As a 32-bit RISC-V
model, it only models the Sv32 virtual addressing in addition to Bare mode. Memory consistency
issues are beyond the scope of the current case study and thus not modeled. (Memory consistency
is briefly discussed in Section 6.1.)
4.3 Summary
From these case studies and the data in Table 2, we make the following observations:
• Accelerator ILAs tend to have a small number of instructions/child-instructions. That is, most
accelerators can be specified by just a handful of instructions.
• The same design can be modeled using ILAs at differing levels of detail. (In the next section
we show how these different models are checked for equivalence.)
• The ILAmodel (or template, when the ILAwas synthesized) has size comparable to a reference
design in C/SystemC/C++/Chisel. Thus, the value of its formal model comes at no additional
cost, in terms of the size of a reference description.
• The ILA model (or template) is significantly smaller than the final RTL implementation,
making this an attractive entry point for verification and validation.
5 CASE STUDIES: VERIFICATION
Table 3. ILA Verification Experiments
Category Designs Models Tools Strength of Proof Time
ILA vs. ILA GB GBH vs. GBL JasperGold complete 2h 27mAES AESC vs. AESV ILA lib+JasperGold† complete 15m
ILA vs. FSM
GB GBH vs. Verilog JasperGold complete 2h 50mGBL vs. Verilog JasperGold complete 16h 12m
RBM ILA vs. SystemC CBMC complete 2h 7mILA vs. Verilog JasperGold complete 6h 54m
RISC-V
Rocket ILA vs. Verilog JasperGold
complete (invariants) 5h 40m
complete (interrupt) 8m
BMC to 40 cycles (instructions) 86h 5m
†ILA library (using Z3) for block-level ILA equivalence, JasperGold for round-level equivalence.
The ILA model can represent specifications or implementations of hardware modules. In this
paper, we focus on using ILAs for hardware verification to check that implementations of accel-
erators/processors match their ILA architectural specifications. This also enables checking that
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different implementations of an accelerator have the same behavior at their interface specified by
an ILA, thereby proving their architecture-level equivalence.
We briefly touch on the underlying formal verification techniques, then discuss ILA-based
verification, and finally describe their evaluation on our case studies.
5.1 Underlying Formal Verification Techniques
SMT solvers [17, 70] provide decision procedures for first-order logic formulas in background
theories, and have found numerous applications in verification. In this work, we use quantifier-free
formulas that use the theories of arrays, uninterpreted functions and bitvectors (QF_AUFBV in the
SMTLIB standard [11]).
Model checking is a verification technique to check correctness properties for a finite state
transition system [25, 48]. Unbounded model checking explores all reachable states of the transition
system while bounded model checking (BMC) [15] restricts the search to all states reachable
within the first k transitions of the system. k is referred to as the bound and is typically set by the
verification engineer. BMC alone cannot prove the absence of property violations, however it is
very effective for bug finding in practice [26].3
5.2 ILA-based Verification
As described in Section 3, the ILA model is a labeled state transition system, but one that em-
phasizes modularity and hierarchy. These features simplify verification through decomposition
along (child-)instructions and architectural state elements. We consider two main settings for
ILA-based verification: (i) ILA vs. ILA, and (ii) ILA vs. FSM. The equivalence of these models is
based on bisimulation relations on the underlying labeled state transition systems [49]. (It is also
straight-forward to consider stuttering in addition, or extend our discussion to model refinement
by using simulation relations and containment checks instead.)
5.2.1 ILA vs. ILA verification. As the GB and AES case studies described in Section 4.1 illustrate,
we can construct ILAs for designs with differing implementations, or even at different levels
of abstraction. A natural application is to check these ILAs for equivalence. In this setting, we
compare two ILAs with the same instructions and sub-instructions, but with possibly different
micro-instructions in the implementation. For ILAs, instruction-based modularity provides the
basis for establishing correspondence between two models, i.e., we check that the behavior of the
ILAs is the same for each instruction and sub-instruction.
Consider first the case where we do not have micro-instructions (implementations) in the ILA
models. Given ILAs X and Y , we check that the issuing condition and the next-state transition
updates for each instruction and sub-instruction are equivalent in the two models. Specifically, the
equivalence for (sub-)instruction i is verified by checking:
(i) equivalence of the valid function: ∀S,W . (V X (S,W ) ↔ V Y (S,W ))
(ii) equivalence of the decode function: ∀S,W . (δXi (S,W ) ↔ δYi (S,W ))
(iii) equivalence of state updates: ∀S,W . (δXi (S,W ) ∧ δYi (S,W ) → (NXi (S,W ) = NYi (S,W ))).
Note, X and Y are shown with the same state variables here, but this can be generalized to a
mapping between their variables.
Now consider the case where we have micro-instructions in the ILA model(s), to represent micro-
architectural implementation choices. We do not enforce equivalence at the micro-instruction
level. Instead we check the equivalence of each instruction and sub-instruction, where each may
3The success of BMC is often ascribed to the “small world hypothesis”: bugs (inadvertent mistakes, as opposed to maliciously
introduced design flaws) are likely reachable through some short sequence of steps from the initial state.
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be implemented using a sequence of micro-instructions. Here, we check equivalence after the
sequence of micro-instructions that implements a instruction/sub-instruction is completed.
To check the equivalence for each instruction, we may need additional abstraction/refinement
mappings to establish "corresponding" states between the two models. Thus, the equivalence check
essentially says that if we start in corresponding states and apply an instruction, then we end in
corresponding states. Here, we leverage well-studied processor verification techniques [19, 42]
that propose and use such mappings. In addition, we use invariants to prune some unreachable
micro-architectural states, such as the invalid combination of the horizontal/vertical frame pointers
of an image in the GB case study. These are often needed to prove the correspondence checks.
5.2.2 ILA vs. FSM Verification . In this setting, we are interested in verifying that a hardware
implementation available as an FSM model (e.g., RTL) corresponds to its ILA specification. As
before, the equivalence between an ILA model and an FSM model is checked for each instruction
and sub-instruction in the ILA. However, unlike the ILA that has a clear set of instructions, an
FSM model is generally a monolithic transition system without a separation between the parts
implementing different instructions/sub-instructions.
Again, we leverage well-studied processor verification techniques [19, 42], and use refinement
mappings to relate the FSM states to the ILA states for each (sub-)instruction. Invariants are also
used to prune unreachable micro-architectural states in the FSM model, e.g., the invariant on an
one-hot encoded counter in the RTL implementation.
Note that ILAs enable a discipline for accelerator implementation verification that is based on
established methodology for processor verification. This is in contrast to customizing general hardware
verification techniques for this task, since determining what/when to check is itself a challenge
and in practice woefully incomplete.
5.3 Experimental Evaluation
We have implemented the ILA-based verification techniques described above, on top of off-the-
shelf verification tools (Z3 [30], JasperGold [20] and CBMC [24]). The correspondence checks on
instructions are expressed as verifying the assertions where the two models end in corresponding
states, given the assumptions that they start in corresponding states and apply the same instruction.
For example, for the Gaussian-Blur accelerator, we check the correspondence of frame pointers
by assuming the two models initially have an equal horizontal/vertical frame pointer pair. Then,
we verify that their frame pointers are equal after theWRITE instruction, regardless of the pixel
accumulating and buffering mechanism. Our ILA library supports translation of the ILA models
into formats supported by these tools. Verification results are summarized in Table 3.
5.3.1 ILA vs. ILA Verification.
GB Accelerator: Recall that we constructed two ILAs (see Section 4.1) for the GB accelerator.
The ILA GBH follows the high-level Halide code, and GBL follows the lower-level C++ code. The
two ILAs have the same instruction set, but GBL has additional micro-instructions to describe
stream buffer and pixel accumulation operations. We check equivalence of each instruction using
the Burch-Dill approach [19], where we use a “flushing" function to relate corresponding states
in the two ILAs. This is needed to abstract away intermediate micro-architectural states in GBL
that are not visible in GBH . Specifically, the checked instruction starts in a state in GBL where
there is no buffered intermediate data. Thus, for each instruction, we check that the architectural
states (IO ports, image frame, pixel pointers, etc.) are equal at the end, whenever the ILAs start in
corresponding initial states. Verification completed in about 2.5 hours using JasperGold.
AESAccelerators: The two ILAs of the AES accelerator were described in Section 4.1. They have the
same instructions at the top level, but different micro-instructions due to different implementations
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of the encryption algorithm. We leveraged the hierarchy in ILA models to decompose equivalence
checking into block-level and round-level equivalence checks.
The AES encryption is a ten-round operation. As both models have one micro-instruction for
each round, we first check the equivalence of such micro-instructions. At the round level, we check
that the generated round keys and ciphertexts are matched after the execution, given their round
keys and cipherstates are matched before the execution. The micro-instructions and the verification
conditions for checking are automatically converted into Verilog to take advantage of hardware
verification tools, which are better at reasoning logic operations in AES encryption. Based on the
equivalence of round-level micro-instructions, we check the equivalence of the ten-round AES
operation by modeling the round-level encryption as an uninterpreted function.
The block-level operations involve fetching plaintext, encrypting data, storing ciphertext, and
maintaining encryption states, e.g., the counter. We check that after processing one block, the
two models should have the same ending state (including shared memory and registers in the
accelerator) if they start from the same state. By proving the equivalence of the micro-instructions
performing block-level operations, the equivalence of START_ENCRYPT instruction, which processes
series of blocks, can be guaranteed. We used our ILA library, which in turn uses the Z3 SMT
solver [30], for checking block-level equivalence, and use JasperGold for checking round-level
equivalence. The total verification time was about 15 minutes.
These two case studies show that ILA equivalence checking can be applied to bridge the gap
between models at different abstraction levels associated with design languages (Halide vs. C++, C
vs. Verilog).
5.3.2 ILA vs. FSM Verification. We consider FSM models at the register transfer level (e.g., in
Verilog) or system level (e.g., in C/SystemC). We check ILA vs. FSM equivalence for two accel-
erators and a general purpose processor. All FSM models are provided independently by other
groups, and not synthesized from ILAs: RBM-SystemC model by the Carloni-Columbia group [55];
Gaussian-Blur-Halide/C++ model by the Horowitz-Stanford group [56]; AES-C/RTL implementa-
tion from OpenCores.org [38]; RISC-V implementation from Berkeley’s Rocket-chip generator [8].
Our previous work [62, 64] has discussed the verification of the 8051 micro-controller and SHA
accelerator, where 8 bugs were found in the RTL model in 8051.
GB Accelerator: We performed equivalence checking between the RTL implementation (generated
by HLS) and each of the two ILAs, GBH and GBL , separately. GBL models more detailed behavior
such as buffering and pixel accumulation, which is similar to the RTL implementation. We provided
invariants to establish corresponding states, and successfully completed verification against each
ILA model. As expected, the verification of RTL against the more detailed GBL took more time than
against GBH (≈ 16 hrs vs. 3 hrs).
Restricted BoltzmannMachine: We exploited the structural similarity between SystemC, Verilog,
and the ILA models to expedite equivalence checking through modular checking. We replaced some
functions in the computation, e.g., the sigmoid function, with uninterpreted functions. (Verification
of these functions can be addressed separately.) We successfully completed verification of the ILA
vs. SystemC (≈ 2 hrs), as well as the ILA vs. Verilog (≈ 7 hrs). This example demonstrates that a
single ILA can be matched against multiple FSM models with implementation-specific differences.
ILA for RV32I vs. Rocket: We synthesized the ILA for the RISC-V specification and verified this
against Verilog of the Rocket processor core generated from a Chisel description [8]. The verification
settings can be found in directory RISC-V/ILAVerif in our GitHub repository. Our focus was on
the processor core, and we separate it from the memory system and the branch predictor. We
abstract the branch predictor by constraining the interface of the processor core where any valid
prediction can arrive in any cycle.
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Our verification had three main steps.
ILA states
RTL states
σ1 σ2
s s1 s2
commit five instructions assume eq prove eq
IV issued IV committed
Fig. 3. ILA vs. FSM Verification of Instruction Execution in Rocket.
(1) First, as discussed in Section 5.2.2, we use implementation invariants to prune unreachable
states in per-instruction equivalence checking. The first category of invariants targets the
correctness of the bypassing network. That is, for each general purpose register, the value
bypassed to the decode stage must be the same as the corresponding when the instruction
at that stage commits. The second category ensures the multiplication/division unit and
co-processors do not generate valid response signals when executing integer instructions.
These invariants are verified using the unbounded model checking engines of JasperGold.
(2) Next, we verified interrupt handling. The RTL handles interrupts by inserting dummy in-
structions in the pipeline, corresponding to the interrupt instruction in the ILA. We proved
that RTL and ILA states match when the interrupt commits (using JasperGold).
(3) Finally, we checked equivalence on ordinary instructions using the inductive proof strategy
shown in Figure 3. The processor is started in an arbitrary state s constrained by the invariants
described in Step (1). Five4 instructions are issued, leading to a state s1 where we assume
that they have been correctly committed, i.e., the ILA state σ1 and RTL state s1 are equal.
Then, a new instruction IV is issued, and we check whether ILA state σ2 and RTL state s2
match when IV commits. We were unable to complete an unbounded proof of this property.
However, except for the bug discussed below, there was no violation up to a bound of 40
cycles using BMC (from s to s2).
Note that the latency of an instruction depends on the response latency from modules like
the data cache. Therefore, it is possible that 40 cycles are not sufficient to guarantee that IV
commits correctly. Future work will build a memory model that can prove full correctness to
avoid this limitation.
The two main challenges in verifying the Rocket core are finding a sufficiently strong set of
invariants so that the inductive proof (step 3) above succeeds and specifying the refinement relation.
Deriving Pipeline Invariants for Rocket Verification:Wederived the “strengthening” invariants
using a counter-example guided approach. Initially, we attempted the inductive check for instruction
equivalence starting with an unconstrained state (i.e., no invariants). This resulted in spurious
counter-examples where the inductive proof failed when starting from unreachable states. Analysis
of these states helped us formulate the set of invariants described in Step (1). These invariants were
checked using the unbounded model checking and then used to constrain the starting state for the
inductive proof described in Step (3) above. The base case of the inductive proof: ensuring that five
instructions commit correctly starting from the reset state was verified separately.
Deriving Refinement Relations for Rocket Verification: As discussed in Section 5.2, the equiv-
alence in Figure 3 is defined with respect to refinement, which consists of a mapping between
the states in Rocket implementation and our ILA model. The states here involve general purpose
4In our experiments, five instructions led to an over-approximation of the reachable states that is “strong” enough to prove
equivalence.
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Fig. 4. The compound transition system used in ILA vs. Rocket processor core equivalence checking.
registers, control and status registers (CSRs), the program counter and memory. The refinement
relations for each of these state variables are as follows:
(1) General purpose registers and CSRs: This refinement relation specifies that the register
values in the ILA model and the Rocket implementation must be equal after each instruction
commits.
(2) Program counter: The program counter’s refinement relation is a little trickier due to branch
prediction and speculative execution. In the Rocket implementation, every pipeline stage
except the fetch stage possesses a program counter variable corresponding to the current
instruction in that stage. The refinement relation for the PC specifies that the program counter
value of the commit stage of the Rocket implementation and the corresponding program
counter value in the ILA model should be equal after each instruction commits.
(3) Memory: Instead of modeling two individual memories and checking value equivalence over
all addresses, we use a shared memory for all memory read operations, and store all the
memory write operations separately for comparison. Equivalence requires that the changes to
memory should be the same when IV commits. We abstract the memory for read operations
by returning arbitrary values for irrelevant read requests, and only enforcing the equivalence
on the requests from IV .
To track the stages where current instruction IV resides, we use a sequence monitor to store the
corresponding stages and use these in specifying the refinement relations.
The compound transition system in Figure 4 shows howwe show that the Rocket implementation
refines the ILA model. This compound transition system has more than 4k bits of flip-flops and
320k gates (reported by JasperGold). JasperGold uses both bounded and ubounded model checking
techniques (both bounded and unbounded) on this transition system and any trace violating the
refinement relations indicates the two models are not equivalent.
Rocket Implementation Bug:We found a bug where the Rocket core incorrectly implements the
trap return instructions. According to the specification [69] these instructions should set the xPIE
bits in mstatus register to 1. However, the implementation sets them to 0. We reported this bug, and
it has been fixed since. This case study illustrates usefulness of our approach on real processors.
5.4 Summary of Verification Experiments
From Table 3, we observe that most verification experiments can derive a complete proof where
“complete” refers to either unbounded proofs, or running BMC to the upper bounds of the instruc-
tions’ latencies. Instructions on the Rocket core are checked up to a bound of 40 cycles, which is
incomplete, but does provide a significant level of assurance.
Overall, our evaluation confirms the viability of equivalence checking using ILAs, where we
leverage the ILA modularity and hierarchy on top of existing verification tools and processor
verification methodology, to successfully verify a range of accelerators and processors. Our case
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studies cover the verification of computation (AES and RBM) as well as processor/accelerator
interfaces (GM and RBM), which is important for accelerator verification.
6 DISCUSSION AND FUTUREWORK
While this paper focuses on the application of the ILA model in verification of a single compute
engine (processor or accelerator), the ILA has other applications as discussed below.
6.1 Modeling Concurrency and Memory Consistency
The ILA model views compute engines (processors and accelerators) as processing a sequence
of instructions. Although the underlying hardware may operate on these instructions in parallel
(similar to pipelined microarchitectures for processors), the programming abstraction it provides is
that of a single sequential thread of control (similar to the ISA-based programming model).
As a next step, we believe that individual ILA models can be composed to perform reasoning
over a concurrent system of multiple accelerator/processor cores. Here, the large body of work
on concurrent programs and multiprocessor systems can be leveraged, and potentially extended
to accelerator-rich systems using ILAs. One natural application is to use concurrent program
verification techniques for checking correctness properties at the system level. This would in-
clude use of well-known methods and tools, such as software model checking with partial order
reduction [25, 37] and compositional frameworks for thread-modular reasoning [33, 52].
Another promising application is in verification of memory consistency models, which capture
rules about operations on shared memory. The ISA plays a central role in many efforts related
to verification of memory consistency – correctness of compiler mappings for higher-level lan-
guages [12, 13], correctness of microarchitecture implementations (including coherence and virtual
memory subsystems) with respect to ISA and microarchitecture specifications [46, 47], and more
recently at the trisection of software, hardware, and ISA [66]. Furthermore, there have been recent
advances in automatic methods for verification [2] and synthesis [18] of axiomatic memory models.
Note that these techniques and tools are not currently directly applicable to accelerators, where
the hardware is described with low-level FSMmodels (e.g., RTL Verilog). More importantly, since the
accelerator memory operations are generally not visible to the processor, ignoring these interactions
with shared memory can have adverse consequences for checking correctness or security of
the overall system. Modeling accelerator behavior as an ILA allows application (and potential
extensions) of these known ISA-based techniques.We are currently working onmemory consistency
modeling for a general shared memory system with multiple processors and accelerators.
Admittedly, this approach does not yet address the challenging issues that currently pervade
memory consistency verification using ISAs. However, it allows some separation of concerns,
whereby good solutions for ISAs can be adapted for ILAs to extend their reach to accelerators.
6.2 Accelerator Code Generation
Accelerators provide efficient hardware implementations of functions that can be offloaded from
programmable processors. When accelerators are deployed, an important and error-prone task
is to program the accelerator to invoke these functions. As discussed in Section 1, the processor-
accelerator interactions often use memory-mapped IO (MMIO). Even when a single ILA instruction
implements a significant function (e.g., block encryption in the AES accelerator example), other
instructions must precede this encryption instruction to set up the encryption key, address of the
block, size of the block, etc. Thus, a sequence of instructions is needed to completely implement
this function. This sequence is often referred to as the accelerator driver code and is typically
provided as library code with the accelerator. For this code to be correct – the instructions that set
up the accelerator must be correct, as must the main accelerator function itself. The ILA model
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enables correct code synthesis using well-known program synthesis techniques (e.g., [3, 41]). In
this set-up, program synthesis seeks a program with k ILA instructions that is equivalent to the
software function f it is replacing. Function f serves as an oracle to guide the search, and the ILA
model provides the accelerator instruction semantics for use in the SMT solver based search for the
program with k-instructions. While this has not yet been implemented, the fact that these driver
programs are short (i.e., k is small) suggests promise for this useful application of the ILA model.
6.3 Reliable Simulator Generation
Given an ILA model, a reliable hardware simulator can be automatically generated for use in
system/software development. The ILA model specifies the state update functions of the architec-
tural state variables. Through hierarchy, it may optionally provide additional micro-architectural
detail. These functions can be used to construct an executable model (i.e. a simulator) in almost
any programming language (we currently use C++). As this simulator is generated from a formal
specification that can be verified against the detailed RTL hardware model, this makes it a reliable
executable model.
Mismatches between a simulator and the hardware it models is a common problem for software
(especially OS) developers. This problem can be addressed through generation of reliable simulators.
As an illustrative example, we note that a previous version of the seL4 RISC-V port makes no use of
the supervisor memory-management fence (SFENCE.VMA) instruction, but still executes correctly
on the spike ISA simulator. The simulator flushes the translation look-ahead buffer more frequently
than either the Rocket implementation or the RISC-V specification’s minimum requirement.
We checked if the missing fence instruction would cause a problem. We removed the gratuitous
TLB flushes in the simulator and embedded an address translation monitor to check whether any
address translation uses a stale page table entry. The OS crashed on this modified simulator, and stale
page table references were observed. This illustrates that the missing SFENCE.VMA could crash on a
seL4 RISC-V port with a hardware implementation that conforms only to the minimum requirement
in the specification. This mismatched behavior between the simulator and the hardware would be a
problem if the OS were later ported to run on real hardware. Although the missing fence instruction
has been added by the seL4 developers in a newer release, the simulator behavior of gratuitous
TLB flushes has not been changed. The RISC-V community knows that the spike ISA simulator
represents only one possible implementation of RISC-V, and that this might be different from a
hardware implementation. However, we believe that it is useful to have an ISA-level simulator
that represents the specification or matches a specific hardware implementation, so that software
developers can be more confident about test results with the simulator.
7 RELATEDWORK
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to formally model accelerator interfaces
using the notion of instructions similar to ISAs for processors. Our previous work in [62, 64] did
introduce the notion of instructions as accelerator abstractions, but did not provide a formal model
of execution. Instead its focus was on template-based synthesis of these abstractions. Further, these
abstractions were defined as finite state transition systems, with no notion of hierarchy and no
applicability to processors. In this work, we introduce the formal ILA model, with hierarchy (sub-
and micro-instructions), that can be used uniformly across processors and accelerators. In addition,
we provide an extensive evaluation of its modeling and verification capabilities on a diverse set of
accelerator and processor designs. Past work [63] has also shown how abstractions can be used for
hardware/software co-verification. In contrast, the focus of this paper is on verification of hardware
implementations against ILA specifications.
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Formal machine-readable and precise specifications [32, 58] of ARM and x86 processors have
been developed. ISA-Formal [59] is a framework aimed at verification of ARM processors against
ISA specifications [58]. However, as discussed earlier, this does not distinguish between different
forms of hierarchy (sub-instructions vs. micro-instructions) needed for correct verification. Further,
interrupts require special handling in their instruction semantics. Others [19, 42] have targeted
verification of processor microarchitecture w.r.t. the ISA. These works target general purpose
processors and do not address verification of accelerators. As discussed, we build on these techniques
for verifying accelerator implementations against their ILA specifications.
As discussed in Section 2, many efforts over the years have proposed the use of high-level models
in design and verification. These include StateCharts, SystemC, Esterel, Transaction Level Modeling
(TLM), BlueSpec, and others [9, 14, 34, 36, 53]. In particular, BlueSpec has been used as a high-level
specification and design language in industry and research [7, 51]. It models hardware components
as atomic rules of state transition systems and enables easy exploration of microarchitectural
design space, e.g., adding a buffer in a pipeline. The commercial BlueSpec compiler synthesizes the
circuit implementation, i.e., Verilog, and exploits parallelism with a scheduler determining how to
interleave the atomic rules [28, 36]. BlueSpec has a well-define operational semantics and supports
modular verification using SMT solvers [29] and interactive-theorem provers [23, 67]. While the use
of high-level models helps raise the level of abstraction, and hence improves scalability in design
and verification, all of these models including BlueSpec lacks two essential ILA features: a clean
separation between hardware and software concerns, and uniform instruction-level treatment of
processors and accelerators. This limits their use in hardware/software co-verification and scalable
verification of systems with heterogeneous hardware components.
A number of hardware/software co-synthesis frameworks [21, 50, 54, 65] attempt to automatically
generate both firmware and accelerator hardware from an algorithmic description. While these
efforts may side-step the need for abstractions for co-verification through correct-by-construction
claims, reasoning about their correctness will itself require a principled abstraction of hardware
with the key ILA features stated above.
Property validation of hardware over Verilog/VHDL models has been advancing since the
adoption of novel model checking techniques, e.g., [40, 43, 68]. These works are orthogonal to our
work. Our key contribution is using ILA as a functional specification of processors/accelerators,
and enabling the use of existing processor verification techniques for accelerator verification. The
verification problem is to check equivalence of instruction-level vs. RTL models, and not validating
individual properties in Verilog/VHDL models, which would otherwise need to be specified for
capturing full functionality.
8 CONCLUSIONS
This paper presents the Instruction-Level Abstraction (ILA) as a formal model for accelerators to
address the heterogeneity challenges of emerging computing platforms. The ILA is a uniform model,
usable across heterogeneous processors and accelerators. Further, it raises the level of abstraction of
the accelerators to that of the processors, enabling formal software-hardware co-verification. The
ILA has several valuable attributes for modeling and verification. It is modular, with functionality
expressed as a set of instructions. It enables meaningful abstraction through architectural state
that is persistent across instructions. It provides for portability through a more durable interface
with the interacting processors. It is hierarchical, providing for multiple levels of abstraction for
modeling complex instructions as a software program through sub- and micro-instructions. It
enables leveraging processor verification techniques for verifying accelerator implementations.
This allows for accelerator replacement using the notion of ILA compatibility similar to that of ISA
compatibility.
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We demonstrate the value of these attributes through modeling and verification of a range
of accelerators (RBM, AES and Gaussian Blur) and a processor (RISC-V Rocket processor core).
We identify modeling gaps in previous formal modeling of ISAs (ISA Formal’s lack of distinction
between hierarchy in specification vs. implementation) and a bug in the implementation of the RISC-
V Rocket core. Further, we demonstrate substantially complete model checking based verification
for our case studies. Regarding scalability, our verification for accelerators from OpenCores (AES)
and processors (Rocket Chip) are the targets over the next four years in the current DARPA POSH
BAA. Finally, we highlight additional applications of the ILA model in reasoning about concurrency
and memory consistency with accelerators, accelerator code generation, and reliable simulator
generation. Overall, these results and contributions provide significant evidence of the value of
ILAs in accelerator-based modeling and verification.
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